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Abstract: In this paper, we aim to model the vertical relation between retailers and suppliers in the 
food industry whereby retailers exercise seller power in their relation with consumers and buyer power 
in their relation  with producers. We then evaluate the degree of price transmission, relative to the 
perfectly competitive benchmark, from the farm to the retail sector assuming a supply shock. With the 
view to evaluating the impact of market power's interaction with industry technology on the degree of 
price transmission, we assume industry technology to be characterised by variable input proportions 
and non-constant returns to scale. Our model predicts that, relative to that which obtains when markets 
are perfectly competitive and industry technology is characterised by constant returns to  scale, the 
degree  of  price  transmission  when  market  power  and  industry  technology  interact  cannot  be 
unambiguously determined.
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1 We are grateful to comments from Steve McCorriston and Tim Lloyd. The usual disclaimer applies1 Introduction
In recent years, the issue of price transmission in vertically related food markets, where the farm and 
marketing  inputs  combine  to  produce  the  final  product,  has  attracted  a  great  deal  of  attention  in 
academic and policy circles in Europe and North America. A plethora of theoretical and empirical 
studies in the price transmission literature and waves of government-commissioned inquiries into retail 
(supermarket) behaviour attest to the degree of attention the issue has attracted in these circles. 
In the UK, the ascendancy of the issue owes much to public dissatisfaction with the pricing practices of 
retail (supermarket) multiples whose level of concentration has shown a dramatic increase in recent 
years. It is generally believed that they exercise market power in their relation with consumers such 
that in the event of any price reduction at the farm level consumers get little in benefit as the gains go 
to widen retailers' margin. It is also believed that they exercise buyer power over suppliers such that not 
only do they force farm price down to a level lower than the perfectly competitive benchmark but they 
also place vertical restraints on suppliers of the farm input. In general, there seems to be a popular 
belief which holds that retail concentration is bad for social welfare. 
This popular belief seems to have found support in economic theory. For instance, Dobson (1997); 
Dobson  (2001);  and  Dobson  (2003)  show  that  under  special  conditions,  an  increase  in  retail 
concentration  may  result  in  a  net  social  welfare  loss.  Contrary  to  the  popular  belief  that  retail 
concentration is detrimental, however, economic theory also shows that under other special conditions, 
an  increase  in  the  level  of  retail  concentration  can  produce  benign  social  welfare  effects.  In  this 
connection,  Dobson  and  Waterson  (1999)  show  that  even  though  retail  concentration  reduces 
competition at all stages of the marketing chain, it can generate productive efficiency benefits that 
enhance consumer welfare.
Thus despite the popular negative perception of retail concentration, economic theory is ambiguous 
regarding the social welfare effects of such concentration. Given this ambiguity, it is not surprising that 
theory  cautions  against  making  hasty  policy  recommendations  regarding  the  regulation  of  retail 
concentration on consideration of only  the  negative social  welfare effects of  such a concentration. Indeed, it advises that any such recommendations involve consideration of a series of welfare trade-
offs.
Indeed,  these  potential  trade-offs  seem  to  have  influenced  the  recommendations  of  a  series  of 
commissioned  inquiries  into  the  behaviour  of  retail  multiples  in  the  UK.  For  instance,  both  the 
Competition Commission (2000) and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981) identified many 
retail  practices  which  stand  to  operate  against  the  public  interest.  However,  neither  of  these 
commissions made recommendations in favour of regulating the behaviour of retail multiples.
Clearly, the ambiguity surrounding the welfare effects of retail concentration points to the difficulty of 
making  prior  judgements  regarding  the  degree  of  price  transmission,  relative  to  the  perfectly 
competitive benchmark, which obtains when the retail market is concentrated. A priori, there is no way 
of telling whether any deviation from this benchmark results from a concentrated retail sector. The 
popular perception is, however, that any such deviations are due mainly to retail concentration which 
increases market power.
Against this background, theoretical work to date has focused on modelling vertical price transmission 
from the farm to the retail sector either allowing for seller power in the retail market as in Holloway 
(1991) and McCorriston et al. (1998) or allowing for both oligopoly (seller) power in the retail sector 
and oligopsony (buyer) power in the supply sector as in Weldegebriel (2004). These works suggest that
the exercise of market power by retailers does not totally explain why farm price changes are not fully 
reflected as retail price changes. Indeed, they suggest that apart from the special cases where the retail 
demand and supply functions are linear, market power's impact on the degree of price transmission is 
often ambiguous.
Even though this ambiguity arises largely because results are determined by the functional forms of the 
retail demand and supply functions, there are indications that several other determinants of the degree 
of price transmission interact with market power to make its impact ambiguous. A recent work by 
McCorriston et al. (2001) has shown that, even assuming a linear retail demand function, allowing for 
non-constant returns to scale in industry technology makes market power's impact on the degree of price transmission ambiguous. Whereas decreasing returns to scale reinforce market power's impact on 
the degree of price transmission, increasing returns to scale weaken its impact.
As far as we are aware, there seems to have been no attempt in the literature to model the impact, on 
the degree of price transmission, of a possible interaction between market power both in the supply and 
retail  sectors  of  the  food  industry  and  non-constant  returns  to  scale  in  industry  technology. In  an 
attempt  to  bridge  this  gap,  we  develop  a  model  whereby  oligopoly  power  and  oligopsony  power 
interact with industry technology. We then evaluate the possible impact of such an interaction on the 
degree of price transmission from the retail to the farm sector assuming a supply shock in the farm 
sector. With this in view, we assume that the supply of marketing services is perfectly competitive and 
that the industry combines inputs in variable
proportions.
We organise the paper as follows. In section 2, we present the theoretical framework whereby we 
extend the models of McCorriston et al. (2001) and of Weldegebriel (2004) allowing for the interaction 
between market structure and non-constant returns to scale. In section 3, we evaluate the degree of 
price transmission under alternative scenarios of market structure and industry technology. We finally 
present the conclusions in section 4.
2. The model
2.1 The theoretical framework
We develop a quantity-setting conjectural variations model of the degree of price transmission in the 
food  industry  when  market  structure  is  characterised  by  market  power  and  industry technology  is 
characterised by non-constant returns to scale. In building this model, we adopt several simplifying 
assumptions. Primarily, we assume that all firms in the industry produce a homogeneous final product. 
Secondly,  following  Kinnucan  (2003)  and  Azzam  and  Pagoulatos  (1990),  we  assume  that  when 
competing among themselves, firms take input quantities as strategic variables. This is consistent with 
short-run  equilibrium  whereby  firms  change  only  their  variable  inputs  in  maximising  profit  since 
capital is a quasi-fixed factor. Thirdly, we assume that the retail sector exercises oligopoly power in its relation with consumers and oligopsony power in its relation with suppliers of the farm product. For 
reasons that are detailed in Rogers and Sexton (1994), we assume that the retail sector exercises no 
oligopsony power over the marketing sector. Furthermore, we assume that the suppliers of the farm 
product  and  of  marketing  services  exercise  no  oligopoly  power  over  the  retail  sector.  Finally,  we 
assume that firms interact among themselves on the basis of conjectural variations
Consider an n-firm food industry which combines a farm product and a marketing input
2 to produce the 
final product sold directly to consumers. Given this vertical relation in the industry, initial equilibrium 
can be defined by the following six equations.
The inverse demand function of the processed product is given by
) 1 ( ) (Q h R 
where R is the price of the processed product, Q is the level of quantity demanded of the food product.
The production function of the industry is given by:
) 2 ( ) , ( M A f Q 
where A and M represent the agricultural and marketing inputs respectively. To allow for non-constant 
returns to scale in industry technology, (2) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree ρ where ρ = 1 for 
constant returns to scale; ρ <1 for decreasing returns to scale; and ρ >1 for increasing returns to scale. 
Furthermore, it is assumed to combine the two inputs in variable proportions. 
The input supply functions for A and M are given, respectively, in inverse form, as:
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and
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where P and W are the prices of A and M respectively whereas Z is an exogenous farm supply shifter.
Finally, the aggregate input demand functions for A and M are given respectively as
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where η (which is normally negative) and ε (which is normally positive) represent the elasticities of 
industry level demand for the final food product and of the farm supply respectively, whereas θ and 
represent the elasticities of conjectural variations in the retail and farm sectors respectively. fA and fB
are the marginal products of A and M respectively. The expressions θ/η and φ/ε represent the aggregate 
measures  of  the  price  mark-up  and  of  the  price  mark-down  in  the  retail  and  farm  input  markets 
respectively. For aggregation issues see Cowling (1976); and Bhuyan (1997).
These are derived from the first order conditions for a maximum of profit of a representative firm with 
respect to A and M which are then summed over n-firms to obtain the industry level input demands.
2.2 Equilibrium displacement following an exogenous supply shock
Displacement of initial equilibrium following a supply shock is achieved by totally differentiating the 
system  of  equations  (1)  -  (6).  Doing  this  and  expressing  percentage  changes  in  logarithmic  form 
yield
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2 Even though the marketing input is a combination of several variable inputs (e.g., labour, packaging, 
transport, etc. ), for tractability, it is assumed to be a single input. 
3 These are derived from the first-order conditions for a maximum of profit of a representative firm 
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 denote  value  shares  of  A  and  M
respectively when the market structure is characterised by market power and industry technology by 
non-constant returns to scale. In equilibrium and assuming constant returns to scale, they add up to 1 
and, in the absence of market power, reduce to the cost shares of A and M denoted by SA and SM
respectively. The  parameter “t”  in (3.1) represents  the  elasticity of  farm supply  to  changes  in  the 
exogenous  supply  shock.  In  (4.1),  the  parameter  γ  denotes  the  partial  inverse  marketing  supply 
elasticity.  Finally, σ  in  (5.1)  and (6.1) denotes  the  elasticity of  substitution  between  the  farm and 
marketing inputs. Given  = ∂ lnη / ∂ ln R , the parameter μ = -θ /(η +θ ) represents changes in the 
mark-up following an exogenous supply shock. On the other hand, for λ = ∂ lnε / ∂ ln P, the parameter 
δ = −λ /(ε +) represents a change in the mark-down which follows an exogenous supply shock.
The percentage changes in the six endogenous variables (Q, A, M, R, P and W) can be solved in terms 
of the percentage changes in the exogenous variable Z. This can be done by substituting equations 
(1.1), (3.1) and (4.1) into (2.1), (5.1) and (6.1) respectively. Doing this produces the following three-
equation system.
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   
Using the percentage changes in R and P, one can then derive the elasticity of price transmission from 
the farm to the retail sector. This is defined as (d ln R / d ln Z) (d ln P / d ln Z) and is given by: 
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3. The elasticity of price transmission when market power and the
returns to scale measure interact
Clearly, the transmission elasticity in (8) is determined, among other things, by the returns to scale and 
market  power  parameters.  The  impact  of  the  returns  to  scale  measure  on  the  elasticity  of  price 
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As (9) clearly indicates, a priori, the impact of the returns to scale measure on the degree of price 
transmission  cannot  be  determined.  The  reason  is  because  δ  is  signed  differently  for  different 
functional forms. To see the signature of δ for different functional specifications, see Weldegebriel op 
cit. For the purpose at hand, assume a linear supply function. Given this specification, δ<0 for inelastic 
supply (i.e., 0<ε ≤1) and δ ≥ 0 either for elastic supply (i.e., ε >1) or for unitary elastic supply. 
Now assume, for convenience and without any loss of generality, a perfectly elastic marketing supply, 
i.e., γ = 0. Then, 
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Given (9.1) and noting that η is normally negative, and the denominator is always positive, τ increases 
with the returns to scale measure, ρ , for δ ≥0; i.e., for an elastic supply. For δ <0, implying inelastic 
supply, on the other hand, τ decreases with ρ.
In the presence of market power and non-constant returns to scale, it is difficult, a priori, to evaluate the 
deviation of the price transmission elasticity from that in the perfectly competitive benchmark. The 
reason is because not only is the outcome of the interaction between oligopoly power in the retail sector and oligopsony power in the farm sector ambiguous but the presence of non constant returns to scale in 
industry technology complicates this interaction. 
To  see  this  clearly,  first  consider  the  price  transmission  elasticity  in  the  perfectly  competitive 
benchmark  which  is  given  by
4:
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Next divide (10) by (9) to obtain,
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which, on assuming =0, can be simplified to:
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To separate the role of returns to scale, assume θ =  = 0 (so that μ = δ = 0 ) and obtain results similar 
to those of  McCorriston et al. (2001):





















Relative to the price transmission elasticity in the perfectly competitive benchmark, the transmission 
elasticity in imperfectly competitive markets is smaller when industry technology is characterised by 
decreasing returns to scale and greater when the technology is characterised by increasing returns to 
scale.
Now, to separate the role of market power, set ρ = 1 and obtain:
                                                























As  (11.1b)  makes  evident,  the  extent  of  deviation  of  the  price  transmission  elasticity  from  the 
competitive benchmark is determined not only by the initial magnitudes of the mark-up and the mark-
down but also by the changes in these magnitudes in response to an exogenous shock. Without a prior 
knowledge  of  the  retail  food  demand  and  farm  supply  functions,  it  is  difficult  to  tell  how  the 
transmission  elasticity  in  the  presence  of  market  power  compares  with  that  in  the  competitive 
benchmark.
For convenience, and with an eye for tractability, normalise the expression (1+θ/η)/(1+ φ/ε) to 1. This 
assumption is not far fetched given that, in their bid for rivalry, dominant firms which exercise market 
power,  may operate  with  a  zero  (or  a  magnitude  close  to  zero)  mark-up  and  mark-down Vickers 
(2005)
5.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  they  do  not  change  their  margins  in  response  to  an 
exogenous supply shock. Thus explaining the deviation of the price transmission elasticity relative to 
the perfectly competitive benchmark only with reference to changes in the mark-up and in the mark-
down is justified.
Applying this normalisation, equation (11.1b) can then be written as:


























As  (11.c)  makes  clear,  whether  there  is  “under-shifting”  or  “over-shifting”  in  the  degree  of  price 
transmission relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark depends on the relative magnitudes of 
changes in the mark-up μ and in the mark-down φ. If, relative to φ, μ is greater, there will be under-
shifting. If, relative to μ, φ is greater, there will be “over-shifting”. If, on the other hand, μ=φ=0 there 
will not be a shift in the degree of price transmission relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark.This suggests that in the presence of oligopoly power in the retail sector and oligopsony power in the 
farm sector, the degree of price transmission relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark cannot be 
unambiguously  determined  as  it  can  either  be  greater,  smaller  or  identical  to  that  in  the  perfectly 
competitive benchmark. The presence of non-constant returns to scale in industry technology adds 
weight  to  this  ambiguous  outcome.  Whereas,  in  certain  instances,  increasing  returns  to  scale  and 
market power can complement each other to enhance the degree of price transmission relative to the 
perfectly competitive benchmark, in other instances they may counter each other’s impact. Similarly, 
whereas in some instances decreasing returns to scale and market power can complement each other to 
dampen the  degree  of  price  transmission relative  to  the  perfectly competitive benchmark, in  other 
instances they may counter each other’s impact.
4. Conclusion
In  this  paper  we  have  explored  the  impact  of  market  power  on  the  degree  of  price  transmission 
allowing for the interaction between oligopoly power in the food retail sector and oligopsony power in 
the farm sector when industry technology is characterised by non-constant returns to scale. The major 
conclusion is that the impact of the interaction between market power and 16industry technology is 
ambiguous. Consequently, the outcomes for the degree of price transmission are inconclusive. Firstly, 
increasing returns to scale technology and market power can either complement each other to enhance 
the degree  of price  transmission relative to  the perfectly  competitive and  constant returns  to  scale 
benchmark  or  counter  each  other’s  impact.  Secondly,  decreasing  returns  to  scale  technology  and 
market power can either complement each other to weaken the degree of price transmission relative to 
the perfectly competitive and constant returns to scale benchmark or counter each other’s impact.
The key to these inconclusive outcomes lies in the functional forms of retail demand and farm input 
supply on the one hand and in the relative magnitudes of changes in the mark-up and in the mark-down 
on the other. The policy implication seems to be that without prior knowledge of changes in the mark 
up and in the mark-down no conclusions can be drawn regarding the interaction between market power 
                                                                                                                                           
5 This is the same as saying that, given constat returns to scale, the value share of the farm input in an 
imperfectly  competitive  market,  A    and  its  cost  share  in  a  perfectly  competitive  market,  SA  are 
identicaland industry technology.  Therefore caution needs to be applied  when making inferences regarding 
industry structure based on empirical estimates of the price transmission elasticity alone.
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